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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL OF BALT. V. WHALEN: TORT 
CLAIMS AGAINST A MUNICIPALITY BY AN INDIVIDUAL 
INJURED WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF A PUBLIC PARK 
ARE BARRED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
By: Andrew Burnett 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that tort claims against a 
municipality by an individual injured within the boundaries of a public 
park are barred by governmental immunity. Mayor & City Council of 
Bait. v. Whalen, 395 Md. 154, 909 A.2d 683 (2006). More 
specifically, a municipality can assert governmental immunity if the 
underlying claim arises from a discretionary governmental function, as 
opposed to an imperative, proprietary function. [d. at 158,909 A.2d at 
685. 
On February 12, 2000, Suzanne Whalen ("Ms. Whalen"), who is 
legally blind, came to Baltimore, Maryland to attend a meeting at the 
National Center for the Blind ("NCB"). On the same day, Ms. Whalen 
took her guide dog to the Leone Riverside Park ("the Park"), which is 
owned and operated by Baltimore City ("the City") and located 
directly across the street from the NCB. While Ms. Whalen was in the 
park she sustained serious and permanent injuries to her back and 
ankle when she fell into an "uncovered, cement-lined pit," located 42 
inches within the boundaries of the park. 
On February 11, 2003, Ms. Whalen filed suit against the City 
claiming it failed to use reasonable care to ensure the hole was 
securely covered or filled. The City moved for summary judgment 
asserting, among other things, that they were immune from suits 
arising from the operation of public parks. On June 9, 2004, the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the City's motion for 
summary judgment. Ms. Whalen filed an appeal in the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, whereby the court decided as a matter of 
law, that it was questionable whether the City was engaged in a 
governmental or proprietary function, and concluded that the lower 
court erred in its decision. The City petitioned for a writ of certiorari, 
which was granted on December 19, 2005. 
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Upon granting certiorari, the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial 
court's decision de novo. Whalen, 395 Md. at 161, 909 A.2d at 687. 
Both parties conceded the incident occurred within the boundaries of 
the Park. Id. at 162,909 A.2d at 688. Accordingly, the Court needed 
to determine if the operation of a public park is a governmental 
function that would allow the City to assert governmental immunity. 
Id. The City successfully argued that the maintenance and operation 
of a public park has traditionally been considered a purely 
governmental function, and thus entitled to governmental immunity. 
Id. The actions of a municipality are considered a governmental 
function if they arise from a legislative enactment, and are considered 
discretionary. Id. at 163, 909 A.2d at 688-89 (citing Mayor & City 
Council v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128,135,173 A. 56, 59 (1934)). On the 
other hand, if a municipality's actions are compUlsory and necessary 
for the populace, they are acting in a proprietary capacity and not 
safeguarded by governmental immunity. Id. at 163,909 A.2d at 689. 
In rejecting Ms. Whalen's argument that maintenance of a public 
park is proprietary and not the beneficiary of governmental immunity 
the Court relied on Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. State, ex reI. 
Ahrens, 168 Md. 619, 179 A. 169 (1935). Whalen, 395 Md. at 164, 
909 A.2d at 689. In Ahrens, a ten-year-old boy drowned while 
swimming in Gwynns Falls Park, which was owned and operated by 
the City. Whalen, 395 Md. at 164, 909 A.2d at 689. Not wanting to 
retard the growth of public park facilities, the Court held that the 
maintenance and operation of a public park was a purely discretionary, 
governmental duty, which is protected by governmental immunity. Id. 
at 165,909 A.2d at 690 (citing Ahrens, 168 Md. 619, 628, 179 A. 169, 
173). To hold otherwise would be against public policy. Whalen, 395 
Md. at 165, 909 A.2d at 689. On the other hand, if the municipal 
interests are imperative, not discretionary, any malfeasance is 
considered a proprietary function that subjects the municipality to civil 
liability. Whalen, 395 Md. at 164, 909 A.2d at 689. Therefore, the 
City acting in a governmental capacity when operating public parks, is 
conducting a purely governmental function, opposed to a proprietary 
function, and as such, possesses governmental immunity. Id. at 163, 
909 A.2d at 688 (citing Austin v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 
286 Md. 51, 405 A.2d 255 (1979)). 
In relying upon Eagers, Ms. Whalen further argued it was 
irrelevant that the hole was within the boundaries of the Park because 
it was reasonably foreseeable that a person walking on the sidewalk 
next to the Park boundary could easily drift 42 inches off the sidewalk 
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into the "contiguous or adjacent" area where the hole was located. 
Whalen, 395 Md. at 166, 909 A.2d at 690. In Eagers, August Eagers 
was walking down a public sidewalk when he was injured by a tree 
limb that fell on him as a direct result of city workers cutting down a 
tree located within the boundaries of the city park. Whalen, 395 Md. 
at 166,909 A.2d at 690. The Court in Eagers held the City was acting 
in a proprietary, rather than governmental capacity, when August 
Eagers was injured. Whalen, 395 Md. at 167, 909 A.2d at 691. The 
City'S action injuring Eagers occurred "while [Eagers] was actually on 
the public way." Whalen, 395 Md. at 167,909 A.2d at 691. 
The Court in Eagers relied heavily on two other cases, Mayor & 
City Council of Havre de Grace v. Fletcher, 112 Md. 562, 77 A. 114 
(1910) and Mayor & Council of Hagerstown v. Crowl, 128 Md. 556, 
97 A. 544 (1916). Whalen, 395 Md. at 167, 909 A.2d at 691. Both 
cases involved individuals who were injured while on public 
walkways by action that occurred off the public walkways. Whalen, 
395 Md. at 167,909 A.2d at 691. As such, Eagers and its progeny are 
limited to acts that occur off public ways that injure individuals 
actually on the public walkways. Whalen, 395 Md. at 167, 909 A.2d 
at 691.. Accordingly, the Court rejected Ms. Whalen's reliance upon 
Eagers, by noting the case was distinguishable from the case at bar. 
Whalen, 395 Md. at 168, 909 A.2d at 691. 
Ms. Whalen also relied on Haley v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore, 211 Md. 269, 127 A.2d 371 (1956), where two individuals 
sustained injuries while on a walkway located within the boundaries of 
a public park owned and operated by the City of Baltimore. Whalen, 
395 Md. at 168, 909 A.2d at 691. The Court in Haley held that even 
though the walkway was within the boundaries of the public park, it 
connected two busy intersections and therefore, was considered a 
public walkway. Whalen, 395 Md. at 168, 909 A.2d at 692. The 
Court in the instant case noted the distinction that Ms. Whalen was not 
traversing on an existing walkway between busy intersections, but was 
injured when she entered the park with no intention to connect to 
another public walkway. [d. at 169, 909 A.2d at 692. 
Precedent has established that the obligation of a municipality to 
maintain and operate a city park is performed in a governmental 
capacity and tort claims arising from an injury within a city park are 
barred by governmental immunity. [d. As such, the Court of Appeals 
held that the trial court did not err in holding the City of Baltimore was 
entitled to governmental immunity. [d. at 170,909 A.2d at 693. 
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The current distinctions in Maryland law between governmental 
and proprietary municipal interests are based on precedent from the 
early 20th century. The concurrence explained that this complicated 
distinction is unclear and difficult to apply. [d. at 171, 909 A.2d at 
683 (Wilner, 1. concurring). On the other hand, it is well settled that 
the operation and maintenance of a public park is a governmental 
function that affords municipalities governmental immunity. [d. at 
165,909 A.2d at 690 (Wilner, 1. concurring). 
Even though this is a long established law, unfortunate 
circumstances like that of Ms. Whalen, or pressure from the citizens of 
Maryland, could prompt the legislature to abolish governmental 
immunity with respect to negligent acts that occur in a public park. In 
Ahrens, the Court decided it would be against public policy to hold the 
municipalities liable for such injuries in fear that it would retard the 
growth and expansion of recreational facilities. However, now that 
there is an abundance of public recreational facilities in Maryland, 
perhaps eliminating governmental immunity in this respect would 
encourage municipalities to ensure these facilities are maintained with 
a higher standard of safety, and to ensure patrons, like Ms. Whalen, 
are not negligently injured. 
